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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PEARL GREGORY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

1

1

Case No.
8695

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained by her
in a train-car collision which occurred at a railroad crossing in Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 26, 1955. The
case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr.,
sitting with a jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case
the defendant moved the court for a directed verdict and
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for a nonsuit. The motion was granted and the case was
dismissed. This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is in substantial agreement with the statement of facts set forth by plaintiff in her brief so far as
it goes. The statement does not afford a complete understanding of the accident as reconstructed by the plaintiff's
evidence, however.
The accident occurred at a railroad crossing near 4th
West and 4th North Streets in Salt Lake City. Fourth
North Street is a divided two-lane highway about 40 feet
wide. At said intersection several of defendant's tracks
cross in a north-south direction. Just prior to the accident
plaintiff's automobile was proceeding west on Fourth North
Street and defendant's locomotive was traveling south on
the westernmost of several tracks crossing said street.
Plaintiff's witnesses demonstrated that from a point in
Fourth North Street approximately 90 feet east of the
point of impact there was a clear view of the track on which
the locomotive was traveling for "probably" l/2 a mile to
the north of the street (R. 23, 24). At a point in the road
about 190 feet east of the point of impact a traveler could
see up the westernmost track for about 1,4 to 1;2 of a mile
if there were no obstructions on the other rails (R. 26, 27).
Plaintiff sought to show that there were certain standing
box cars on the rails to the north of the street which would
partially obstruct the traveler's view of the west track.
The evidence completely failed to establish a material ob-
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struction, however. A police officer called by plaintiff as
a witness testified that there were standing cars "several
hundred feet" to the north of the north line of 4th North
Street (R. 44, 45). In response to questioning by the court
this witness said :
"A. As I recall I walked back up the roadway
and looked at the point of vision and, as I recall, the
box cars didn't offer an obstacle as far as the vision
was concerned."
His testimony was that immediately after the accident he
had walked back a little east of the watchman's shanty to
determine a motorist's view of the track on which the locomotive was approaching and found no obstruction to vision
(R. 47). This shanty is located more than 150 feet east of
the rail where the accident occurred. It thus appears from
the plaintiff's own witness that 150 feet east of the point
of accident a motorist had an unobstructed view to the
north of the track on which the locomotive was traveling.
Plaintiff's husband, Marion Gregory, who was driving the
automobile testified that there were standing box cars on
the rails two or three tracks east of the rail where the
accident occurred and about 50 feet north of Fourth North
(R. 20). With regard to Gregory's view of the westernmost track, he said: (D. 19)
"Yes sir ; there was some box cars setting down
there. I wouldn't say it prevented me from seeing
a train coming on a certain track, but there were
some box cars there."
It is thus clear that for many car lengths to the east of
the point of impact Gregory had an unobstructed view of
the track on which the locomotive was traveling.
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The accident occurred on December 26, 1955, at approximately 11:50 a.m. It was a clear day. The road was
dry. The train involved was a diesel pulling 27 cars (R.
52).
The only eye-witness account of the accident was given
by Marion Gregory, the driver of the automobile. Gregory
testified that as he approached the railroad tracks he
stopped his car (D. 10, 13). He then started up and drove
a distance of over 100 feet, at a constant speed of three to
four miles per hour to the point where the train and car
collided (D. 14, 23, 24). The speed was characterized as
being comparable to a fast walk. The officer whom plaintiff called said that the car at this speed could be stopped
in about four feet (R. 58). Gregory testified that as he
approached the easternmost track he heard a diesel engine
but that, he didn't see a watchman and therefore didn't
pay any attention to it (D. 9, 10, 13, 14). The physical
evidence compels the conclusion that the train was in full
view as Gregory approached the westernmost track. Notwithstanding this he failed to see the train until it was six
to ten feet from the car (D. 21). At that time it was too
late to prevent the accident as the car was either on, or
right to the edge of the track (D. 21). In answer to counsel's questioning Gregory testified as follows: (D. 15, 16)
"Q. Now I think you said, not seeing the
watchman, you assumed it was clear to go, and you
went on, is that right?
"A. That is right.
"Q. All right, as you proceeded on west, Mr.
Gregory, then I think you indicated, in answer to my
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question about whether you could still hear the
sound of this Diesel, that that was out of your mind,
because you didn't see a watchman there, and you
assumed you could go on.
"A. I assumed the right-of-way was mine, and
I was safe.
"Q.

that?
"A.

You heard the sound of the Diesel before
Before that.

"Q. And you paid no attention, after you
started, because there wasn't a watchman there,
and you figured it was safe to go?
"A. I figured that was my protection.

"Q. Well then, as you proceeded to the west,
did you ever see this particular engine that struck
your car, prior to the time that it hit it?
"A. I never seen it before, it seemed to me-now I want to get as close to it as I can-it was
between six and eight feet of me, or ten, something
like that.

Now listen, a thing like that could be done so
quick"Q. Mr. Gregory, I appreciate and understand
that very well, and all you can do is give your best
judgment.
"A. That is right.
"Q. And you best judgment is that you saw
this Diesel Engine about six to ten feet, prior to the
time that it hit you?
"A. That is right.

"Q.

And that is the first time that you saw

"A.

And that is the only time I saw it.

it?
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"Q.

"A.

The first and only time you saw it?
That is right."

When Gregory saw the engine he threw his head to
the right directly into the diesel's burning headlight and
the impact occurred (D. 17).
Although plaintiff alleged that the train was exceeding the lawful speed limit there was absolutely no evidence
that it was. Plaintiff also sought to show that no bell or
whistle was sounded as the train approached the crossing
but the only evidence even remotely tending to prove these
allegations was the testimony of Marion Gregory to the
effect that he could not state whether or not a bell or whistle
was sounded (D. 17-18). Plaintiff did testify that he expected to see a watchman if any train was approaching the
crossing and that he saw no watchman.
Defendant's motion for directed verdict was grounded
upon its contention that there was no evidence of actionable
negligence on the part of the defendant and that plaintiff's
evidence demonstrated as a matter of law that the negligence of Marion Gregory and of the plaintiff was the sole
cause of the accident.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT.
(1)

There Was No Evidence That Defendant
Was Guilty of Actionable Negligence.
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(2)

The Negligence of Marion Gregory and of
The Plaintiff Was The Sole Cause of The
Accident.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT.
(1)

There Was No Evidence That Defendant
Was Guilty of Actionable Negligence.

The plaintiff's evidence completely failed to establish
any negligence on the part of the defendant which could
have proximately contributed to the accident.
There was no evidence whatsoever that the train was
traveling at an excessive speed. Only two witnesses were
interrogated as to the speed of the locomotive. Marion Gregory replied in response to counsel's question as to how fast
the locomotive was traveling:
"I wouldn't begin to try to tell you how fast.
It might have been running ten mile an hour and it
might have been running sixty, I don't know (D.
26) ."
The police officer who investigated the accident was unable to state from the physical evidence how fast the train
had been traveling before the impact. There was no showing whatever that the train was traveling at an excessive
rate of speed. As a matter of fact there was no evidence
from which the jury could have made a finding as to speed.
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In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is to be
presumed that the train was traveling at a safe and reasonable speed and was not exceeding the lawful speed limit.
Counsel for plaintiff urges in their brief that there was
evidence from which the jury could have found that the
defendant negligently failed to sound a whistle or a bell
as it approached the crossing. The only testimony bearing
on this issue was offered by Marion Gregory, the driver of
the car. His testimony was as follows: (D. 17, 18)
"A. I wouldn't say I could hear the bell ringing or anything.
"Q. Would you say, Mr. Gregory, the bell
wasn't ringing?
"A. No, I wouldn't say it was, nor I wouldn't
say it wasn't.
"Q. Did you hear any sound of a whistle?
"A. No sir, there wasn't any whistle blowed
I didn't think.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"I am not going to be positive; I am not going
to say something I didn't know.
Would you say Mr. Gregory that such a
whistle was not blown?
"A. No sir, I wouldn't. I wouldn't say it
wasn't; I wouldn't say it was."
"Q.

The plaintiff who was actually closer to the locomotive
than Mr. Gregory offered no testimony whatsoever with
regard to the bell or whistle. It is submitted that the testimony of Gregory is not substantial enough to support a
finding by the jury that the defendant failed to sound a
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bell or whistle. We think this is particularly true in view
of the fact that Gregory admitted that as he approached the
point of impact he was not particularly paying attention
to the noises about him (D. 9). As a matter of fact after
Gregory had stopped his automobile just east of the easternmost track, he heard the sound of a diesel motor but
paid no attention to this sound as he started up and proceeded west on Fourth North (D. 9) . He further testified
that because the road looked clear the sound of the diesel
which he had heard left his mind (D. 10). This case is
similar to that of Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company, 59 Utah 366, 204 Pac. 101, where a judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed, the court holding that negative testimony as to the failure of the defendant railroad
to ring a bell was insufficient to support a finding of no
warning. The court there said :
"This is not a case in which the witness claims
to have been listening for signals and failed to hear
them."
From the earlier decisions of this court it appears clear
that negative testimony of the character involved in the
instant case has no probative value whatsoever unless it
appears from the testimony of the witness that he was
actually listening for warning sounds and that he was
actually paying attention to what occurred. Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, supra; Clark v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 70 Utah 29, 257 Pac. 1050;
Anderson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 76 Utah
324, 289 Pac. 146. In the later case of Hudson v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 120 Utah 245, 233 P. 2d 357,
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this court stated that the test is whether under all of the
circumstances the "warnings would have awakened [the
witness'] attention to them." It is manifest from the plaintiff's own testimony that he was oblivious to the noises
about him and that he was blindly relying upon the absence
of a watchman as assurance that there were no approaching
trains. He was very frank to state that a whistle might
have been sounded and that a bell might have been rung
and that he was in no position to state that no whistle was
sounded or that no bell was rung. We submit that such a
feebl~ showing is not substantial evidence which would
support a finding by the jury.
It is next contended by counsel that plaintiff's evidence
would have supported a finding by the jury that the railroad failed to maintain a proper lookout for the approach
of motor vehicles. There is no evidence whatsoever that
the engineer of the locomotive was not looking for approaching traffic or that he did not see the plaintiff's automobile.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the operator of the
defendant's locomotive had a legal right to assume that the
plaintiff's automobile, which was traveling at a rate of
three to four miles per hour would stop short of the track
on which the locomotive was traveling and yield the lawful
right of way. The automobile could have been stopped in
four feet. The train with its 27 cars required 612 feet to
come to a stop after the impact.

This court was confronted with an identical problem
in the case of Van Wagoner, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 112 Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293, where the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant's train operators failed to keep
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a proper lookout. Plaintiff's counsel excepted to the trial
court's refusal to submit the issue to the jury. In dealing
with this contention, the court said:

"* * * While both objects were approaching the crossing the crew was entitled to assume the
truck would stop until such time as a reasonably
prudent person would know otherwise. Under the
facts and circumstances of this case, a failure to act
in time to avoid a collision does not establish a failure to look.
"Even were we to assume the train crew failed
to keep a proper lookout, appellants must still fail
in their assignment, as assuming the truck was
stalled for a couple of seconds ; if it is intended to
submit this question to the jury, there must be a
basis for concluding that the failure to keep a
lookout proximately contributed to the accident.
* * * Assuming that when the truck stalled, as
testified to by Miss Bowers, and this would be the
first opportunity the train crew would have of
knowing it was stalled, and assuming further that
the engineer saw the truck, could the jury reasonably
have found that the collision would have been
avoided? Not unless there was sufficient time for
the train crew to have stopped the train or, assuming the warning signals not to have been given, to
permit these signals to have been given and the
deceased to have been warned in time to have
jumped clear of the train. A fair reading of the
evidence warrants a finding by the trial court that
regardless of whether or not the train crew was
keeping a lookout, this could not have been a proximate cause of the collision. Because of the weight
of the train, the impossibility of turning to avoid
objects in its path, the same right of way rule does
not apply as in the case of two automobiles. Trains
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cannot be stopped in time to avoid collisions if the
time interval is shortened to a matter of two seconds, and warnings are of no avail if they cannot
be given in time to permit a person to escape from
his position of peril."
Even assuming a failure to keep a proper lookout, this
could not, as demonstrated, have been a proximate cause of
the accident. The final alleged act of negligence on the part
of the railroad was the failure to provide a watchman to flag
down approaching traffic. There is no common law duty
imposed upon railroads to maintain watchmen at all crossings. Under certain exceptional circumstances where conditions of extreme danger exist, it has been held that railroad companies must maintain either a watchman or provide other suitable warning devices. There is no showing,
however, from the facts of the instant case that there was
any unusual or extreme danger involved in the crossing
which is the subject of this action. It was broad daylight
at the time of the accident. There were no substantial
obstructions to the vision of motorists either to the south
or to the north of the crossing. There was nothing about
the physical arrangement which might be confusing to a
motorist. In fact the only other equipment of which the
witnesses were aware was a few standing box cars located
north of the intersection and two or three tracks east of
the rail on which the locomotive was approaching. It is
firmly established in this jurisdiction that railroad tracks
are in themselves a warning of danger. In addition to this,
plaintiff's evidence clearly establishes that there were
appropriate signs posted at the approach to the crossing,
and plaintiff himself testified that he was "very familiar"
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with the crossing and knew that he had to cross several
tracks. He did testify that he had seen watchmen at the
crossing on prior occasions but this would cerainly not
justify or explain the conduct of Gregory as he traveled
obliviously into the path of the heavy locomotive. If by
some stretch of the imagination it be held that under the
circumstances of this case the failure of the defendant to
maintain a watchman was negligence, still it is clear that
such negligence did not proximately contribute to the accident. It is undisputed that Gregory stopped his car at the
east rail where the watchman would have been. He then
started his car and traveled approximately 150 feet from
the point where the watchman would have been to the
point where the accident occurred. His negligence in failing to maintain a proper lookout as he approached the accident site was an independent and efficient cause of the
accident. We certainly do not concede that the railroad had
a duty to maintain a watchman at this crossing, but in any
event, even if there was such a duty, any antecedent negligence on the part of the railroad in failing to maintain a
watchman at a point 150 feet east of the accident site was
not a direct and proximate cause of the accident. Under
the circumstances of this case the absence of a watchman
bears only on the issue of the negligence of the motorist.
It is no justification whatsoever for the failure of Gregory
to look and to see the approaching locomotive.
We submit that there was no evidence offered by the
plaintiff from which the jury could have found that defendant was guilty of actionable negligence.
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(2)

The Negligence of Marion Gregory and of
The Plaintiff Was The Sole Cause of The
Accident.

That Marion Gregory was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law is too clear for labored argument. Plaintiff's
evidence conclusively shows that as Gregory approached
the west rail of the crossing he had an unobstructed view
in the direction in which the defendant's locomotive was
traveling for a distance of 14 to l/2 mile. Yet he failed to
see the approaching train until it was too late to prevent
the accident. He admits that he heard a diesel engine when
he was over 100 feet from the accident site and yet he paid
no particular attention to it. When the locomotive was six
to ten feet away he said it made a "loud noise" and sounded
like a "cyclone" (D. 16, 17). His awareness of the sound
of the locomotive came too late, however, to prevent the
accident. Since counsel for plaintiff concedes the negligence of Marion Gregory in their brief, we will not lengthen
this argument with an analysis of the cases pertinent to the
issue of his negligence. Suffice it to say that he clearly
failed to look and• listen as he approached the crossing or
failed to heed what he heard and saw and was in this regard
negligent as a matter of law. Benson v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.
2d 790; Nuttall v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; Wilkinson v. 0. S. L.
Ry. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 Pac. 466; Abdulkadir v. The Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339.
Even if it be assumed, contrary to the evidence and to
the facts, that the defendant failed to warn of the approach
of the locomotive by watchmen, whistle or bell, still the
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conduct of Gregory in driving obliviously into the path of
the locomotive is not any less the cause of the accident. In
this regard the court's statement in Holmgren v. Union
Pacific Railroad Company, 114 Utah 262, 198 P. 2d 459, is
pertinent:
"The failure of the blinker signal to warn
Holmgren of the approaching train was not an invitation for him to proceed blindly across the tracks

* * *"
See also Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company,
111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903, where a signal bell was not
operating. To the same effect is Nuttall v. Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d
15, where it was said :
"Before a motorist can be justified in making
any assumption that signals will be given or that
the train will be operated at a lawful speed he must
first slow up, listen for signals, and look attentively
up and down the track. 'If * * * by looking,
[he] could have seen an approaching train in time
to escape, it will be presumed, * * * either
that he did not look, or, if he did look, that he did
not heed what he saw.' "
We think that the negligence of Gregory in driving his
automobile in clear view of the locomotive directly into the
path of danger was the sole cause of the accident. The
defendant was not required by law nor could it reasonably
have been expected to foresee such conduct on the part of
1.!
the defendant. The rationale of the decision of this court
il
in Haarstrich v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 100,
nll
seems to us to be controlling in the instant case. In the
~- Haarstrich case plaintiff was a guest in an automobile

{lj
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which collided at nighttime with a train at a railroad crossing on Beck Street. Plaintiff's evidence was that the defendant failed to sound appropriate warnings by blowing
a whistle, ringing a bell, providing a switchman or even
having a light on the car of the train. The driver of the
car did not see the train until it was 13 to 15 feet away.
In ruling that the negligence of the driver of the automobile was the sole proximate cause of the accident, this
court said:
"The street lights were functioning, and there
appears to have been no reason whatever why he
could not have stopped his car and avoided the collision if he had looked ahead and applied his brakes
at the proper time. In view of the indubitable facts
disclosed by the evidence, it is wholly immaterial
whether the defendant strictly complied with the
law as to warnings and signals. Its failure in that
regard, * * * had nothing whatever to do with
the accident and was in no sense the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury."
Under the facts of the instant case, it was broad daylight. The train was actually 15 feet onto the crossing at
the time of the impact. As in the H aarstrich case, there is
no reason why Gregory could not have seen the locomotive
had he only looked. As a matter of fact the evidence is that
he did hear the diesel locomotive several yards back from
the point of accident and yet paid no attention to it.
We submit that the evidence compels the conclusion
that Gregory's negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the accident.
In further support of the trial court's ruling, we submit
that even if it be held that there was evidence from which
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a jury would have found negligence on the part of the
railroad which was a proximate cause of the accident, the
plaintiff is still not entitled to recover as she was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

e

The evidence is clear that Gregory did not see the defendant's locomotive until it was eight to ten feet from
his automobile and even at that time his awareness of the
train was not brought to his attention by any warning
given by the plaintiff. Plaintiff was sitting in the front seat
of the automobile. It is undisputed, as heretofore pointed
out, that the plaintiff had an unobstructed view of the
approaching train when the driver still had ample opportunity to prevent the accident had he been aware of the
locomotive's approach. As a matter of fact the plaintiff
probably had a better view to the north as she was sitting
on the north side of the automobile. It also appears manifest from the testimony of Marion Gregory that the train
was making a "loud noise" and that it sounded like a "cyclone" as it moved into the automobile, yet no warning
was offered by the plaintiff that an approaching train had
been seen or heard.

Although a passenger in an automobile does not have
J\
the same duty as the driver in listening and maintaining
a lookout, it has been established in this jurisdiction that
the passenger owes at least some duty to exercise care in
~~ warning of manifest dangers which are or should be ap~: parent at railroad crossings. In this regard we cite the
case of Lawrence v. Denver and Rio Grande Railway Com!~ pany, 52 Utah 414, 174 Pac. 817. Although later decisions
~~ have made inroads on the rationale of the Lawrence case,
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we think the holding of that case is particularly appropriate
to the facts of the case at bar. In ruling that the plaintiff
passenger was guilty of contributqry negligence as a matter
of law in failing to warn the driver of an approaching train
the presence of which the court said the guest should have
been aware, Justice McCarty stated:
"Assuming for the sake of argument, but not
conceding, that plaintiff was merely the guest of
Bird, and was in no sense responsible for the manner in which Bird operated and managed the automobile while making the trip in question, it nevertheless was incumbent upon him to exercise ordinary
care and prudence by making diligent use of his
senses of sight and hearing, by looking and listening
for trains as the automobile approached the crossing,
and to heed the warnings and signals of the approach
of the train, and to suggest to Bird that they stop
until the danger was over, and to protest if that
was not done. (Citing Cases.) "
This principle should have application, where, as in the
instant case, the proximity of a train is so manifestly apparent and yet constitutes such an immediate hazard.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that plaintiff introduced no evidence proving or tending to prove that the railroad was guilty of
actionable negligence and that the undisputed evidence
shows as a matter of law that the negligence of Marion
Gregory and of the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause
of the accident, or in any event that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence. The judgment of dismissal
should therefore be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Clifford L. Ashton,
Leonard J. Lewis,
Grant Macfarlane, Jr.,

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah.
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